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Abstract
We study experimentally the drivers of behavior in committees featuring publicly known
diverse preference who engage in voting preceded by one shot cheap talk communication.
On the aggregate, we find low lying levels and different preference types using decision rules
biased towards the majority heuristic which consists in following the majority of announced
signals. Our results are inconsistent with the predictions derived from the standard model
as well as models of social preferences and homogeneous naive behavior. Results are instead
consistent with the predictions of a model of cognitive heterogeneity, in which a large
majority of unsophisticated subjects truth-tells and uses the majority decision heuristic,
while a minority of sophisticated agents lies strategically and applies its payoff-maximizing
decision rule, albeit with noise.
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1 Introduction
Collective decision-making commonly brings together individuals whose preferences are heteroge-
neous. Examples include parliamentary committees consisting of members of different political
parties or boards of directors consisting of different types of stakeholders (public and private
stockholders, employees, etc). Collective decision-making often has a common value dimension
as members would favour the same decision if the state of the world were known (e.g. whether a
defendant is guilty or innocent, whether a reform will lower unemployment, whether a job candi-
date is competent). Given uncertainty about the state, disagreement may arise because different
committee members value the two potential types of error differently (false positive vs. false
negative).1 When heterogeneous preferences are publicly observed, rational and self-interested
individuals have incentives to misrepresent their private information, if voting is preceded by a
non-binding straw vote (Coughlan, 2000), the latter being equivalent to one round of simultane-
ous cheap talk. Incomplete information sharing is wasteful from a welfare perspective because
pooling of information increases the probability of making a correct decision.
Goeree and Yariv (2011) offer a first experimental study of communication and voting in
heterogeneous committees, which constitutes the starting point for our experiment. The authors
examine a setting featuring privately known preferences and free-form communication. They find
a dominant pattern of behavior consisting of truth-telling followed by voting with the majority
of announced signals. The experiment raises two types of questions. The first concerns the
robustness of their findings: To what extent is the very high rate of truth-telling found driven
by the assumptions of free-form communication and uncertainty about preference types? Both
assumptions arguably push towards more truth-telling. Would a simpler communication protocol
(e.g. a straw-vote) as well as a more clear cut conflict (i.e. publicly observed heterogeneous
preference types) give rise to more strategic communication?
The second type of question raised by Goeree and Yariv (2011) concerns the underlying
drivers of the behavior that they document. The authors explain that ”groups make choices that
are consistent with the welfare maximizing decisions given the available aggregate information
in the group” (see p. 895). This explanation implicitly alludes to subjects exhibiting social
preferences, but the authors take no explicit stance on the issue and make no attempt to test
1For example, there is a large body of empirical evidence showing that jury members hold heterogeneous pref-
erences regarding the possibility of convicting an innocent defendant vs. acquitting a guilty defendant. Different
preferences may be rooted in political attitudes, demographic characteristics, personality traits, etc. In the psycho-
logical literature on judicial decision-making, empirical studies examine the effects of demographic and personal
characteristics on behavior in jury deliberation (for reviews see MacCoun, 1989; Pennington and Hastie, 1990;
Devine et al., 2001; Sommers and Ellsworth, 2003).
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alternative models. One can envisage two potential deviations from standard assumptions that
may positively affect the amount of truth-telling observed, namely social preferences and cognitive
constraints. If, for instance, individuals’ objective function is to maximize joint payoffs instead
of individual payoffs, lying incentives are eliminated. Alternatively, agents may face cognitive
constraints that make them unable to communicate strategically or to identify their payoff-
maximizing decision rule, leading them to use simple heuristics (e.g. truth-telling, following the
majority of signals).
Our experiment is aimed at addressing the above two classes of questions. We examine a
three-person deliberative jury game (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Coughlan, 2000) with two
publicly known preference types and majority rule and explicitly test not only the standard model
but also a set of alternatives. The assumptions of (1) known heterogeneous preferences as well as
(2) communication in the form of straw votes are both empirically and theoretically motivated.
Preferences often correlate with observable characteristics and committee members often have
relevant information about each other. Theoretically, the setups exhibit very different predictions.
Full pooling is essentially more difficult to achieve with publicly known heterogeneous preferences,
so that we expect strategic lying to be more salient. As to our focus on straw votes (pre-defined
messages), these would appear to minimize the scope for the emergence of social preferences
through communicative interaction, as compared to free form chats, thus in principle offering
more potential for strategic interaction.
Our experimental design allows us to investigate the underlying drivers of behavior, i.e.,
whether social preferences or cognitive constraints significantly affect communication (or the
potential absence of strategic communication). Our design varies (a) the information provision
protocol (public signals vs. private signals) and (b) the committee composition (homogenous vs.
heterogeneous), thus yielding four treatments. Consequently, we can observe voting with and
without prior communication keeping constant the number of signals that are available in the
committee. This comparison is novel in the literature, which has focused on comparing private
voting and voting after communication of private signals (Guarnaschelli et al., 2000; Goeree and
Yariv, 2011).
We derive testable predictions from three models, the “standard” model of own payoff-
maximizing strategic agents (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998; Coughlan, 2000; Le Quement
and Yokeeswaran, 2015) and two behavioral alternatives. The first alternative is a social prefer-
ence model of joint payoff maximization. The second alternative is a näıve voter model where
all individuals truth-tell and use a decision heuristic which specifies voting in line with the ma-
jority of announced signals (majority heuristic). This second model is in the spirit of Condorcet
(1785), who assumes non-strategic jury members who simply favour the alternative that is the
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most likely to be correct.
On aggregate, our results reject the predictions derived from the standard model and both
behavioral alternatives: (a) We find no evidence of babbling as predicted by our equilibrium for
the standard model; (b) given public signals, the preference profile of the committee (heteroge-
neous vs. homogenous) does not affect individuals’ voting behavior as predicted by the social
preference model; (c) the two different preference types do not use the same decision rule as
predicted by the näıve voter model.
In a second, more preliminary and explorative part of our analysis, we disaggregate results
across individuals and find significant heterogeneity. We introduce a model of level-k thinking
(see for instance Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) and
noisy behavior. Level-0 agents behave as in the näıve voter model. Level-1 agents best respond
in a noisy fashion to the assumption that all others are level-0 agents. They lie when they hold a
signal that is contrary to their preference bias and apply their payoff-maximizing decision rule at
the voting stage. Our findings suggest that subjects can be meaningfully assigned to these two
general level-0 and 1 categories. The vast majority of subjects (82%) consistently truth-tells and
uses its type-specific optimal decision rule only very seldom, in only 24% of all cases, reverting
otherwise to the majority-heuristic. In contrast, 18% of subjects consistently lie after a signal
contrary to their preference bias and use their type-specific optimal decision-rule on average
60% of the time. Consistent lying thus significantly associates with applying the type-specific
payoff-maximizing decision rule.
Summarizing, our analysis yields two main findings. First, at an aggregate level, dominant
truth-telling is not simply an artefact of free-form communication and unknown preference types.
Second, aggregate results cover up heterogeneous underlying behavior that is consistent with the
presence of different cognitive types. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experimental
study to indicate the relevance of the level-k thinking model to committee voting, in particular
the variant with communication. Generally speaking, the finding is in line with pre-existing
experimental findings on level-k play in cheap talk games (see Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al.,
2010; Kawagoe T, 2009).
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the literature. Section 3 presents
our experimental design and Section 4 the theoretical predictions. Section 5 analyzes aggregate
behavior with an eye to testing the respective predictions. Section 6 focuses on heterogeneity




Building on Condorcet’s seminal essays on voting (see Condorcet, 1785), a theoretical literature
that models voting as information aggregation has blossomed over the last two decades. Early
contributions (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998) study private
voting (see also Gerardi, 2000; Martinelli, 2006; Meirowitz, 2007; Persico, 2004; Feddersen and
Pesendorfer, 1996). Key findings have been confirmed and qualified experimentally in Guar-
naschelli et al. (2000), Esponda and Vespa (2014), Grosser and Seebauer (2016), Battaglini et al.
(2008), and Battaglini et al. (2010).
A set of newer contributions study the case of voting preceded by communication and have
focused on the truthful-sincere equilibrium. A milestone is the negative result obtained by
Coughlan (2000) for the case of publicly known heterogeneous preference types: If full truth-
telling leads to disagreement, then there exists no truthful-sincere equilibrium. Le Quement
and Yokeeswaran (2015) provide an equilibrium prediction for such committees under unanimity
rule. Deimen et al. (2015) offer a complementary analysis that assumes conditionally correlated
signals. A parallel research agenda has studied the extent to which uncertainty about preference
types affects the possibility of communication (Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006; Meirowitz,
2007; Van Weelden, 2008; Le Quement, 2013).
Voting with communication has also been examined experimentally.2 Guarnaschelli et al.
(2000) study a homogeneous jury and find, in contradiction with the intuitive prediction of full
truth-telling, a 5% lying rate and skepticism towards information provided by others. Goeree
and Yariv (2011) study the case of privately known (and potentially heterogeneous) preference
types with free-form communication. The authors’ confirm the theoretical prediction formulated
in Gerardi and Yariv (2007), namely that all voting rules are equivalent given unrestricted com-
munication. Furthermore, they find that subjects on average follow a simple heuristic consisting
in truth-telling combined with voting according to the majority of announced signals.
In seeking to identify the drivers of behavior in the communication and voting game, we draw
on ideas taken from two strands of literature, namely social preferences and bounded rationality,
each of which proposes models that have been successfully applied to a variety of games. The
social preferences literature features outcome-based models focusing on inequity aversion or taste
for efficiency as well as intention-based models that analyze the role of reciprocity, kindness, etc
(see for example Rabin (1993); Fehr and Schmidt (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels (2000); Charness
and Rabin (2002)). The social preference model that we use is an outcome-based model and
2Our focus, as well as that of the here reviewed literature, is on deliberation as information aggregation. We
refer to Hafer and Landa (2007) and Dickson et al. (2008) for theoretical and experimental work on deliberation
modeled as a rational and strategic process of self-discovery.
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assumes that agents care about the sum of committee members’ payoffs, reflecting both a taste
for efficiency and inequity aversion. As to the literature on bounded rationality, we use ideas
from two sub-strands, namely the level-k reasoning model and the quantal response model. The
former (see Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) assumes
agents exhibiting different depths of reasoning.3 The model has successfully been used to describe
behavior in cheap talk games (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010; Kawagoe T, 2009). The
quantal response model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998) assumes that agents act noisily in
response to correct equilibrium beliefs. The simple model of bounded rationality that we propose
in the last part of our analysis combines elements of these two models.
3 Experimental Design
We here describe the treatments and the experimental procedure.
3.1 Treatments
Our main treatment is a Condorcet Jury Game with private information and heterogeneous
preferences. A committee, composed of three subjects, has to choose between two alternatives
by majority vote. If the state of the world were known, each preference type would favor choosing
the alternative that matches the true state of the world. However, different preference types value
the two potential errors differently. The state of the world is not observable, but takes one of
two possible values, both being ex ante equally probable. Specifically, the state is the (red or
blue) jar selected by nature and the decision is either red or blue.4
The timing of the game is as follows. There is an information stage (stage 1) at which
information regarding the color of the jar is received and exchanged. At stage 2, each subject
casts a vote from the set {red, blue} and a collective decision is made. In stage 3, subjects observe
the number of votes for each jar, the committee decision, the jar selected by nature as well as
their payoffs.
We vary the main treatment on two dimensions: (a) the preferences of subjects and (b) the
information protocol, see Table 1 below.
Preferences (Heterogeneous vs. Homogenous): In heterogeneous (Het) committees there
are two possible preference types, red or blue, whose payoffs depend on the group decision
3See also Goeree and Holt (2004) for a related model of noisy introspection.
4We follow Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) and Goeree and Yariv (2011) in adopting a neutral description. In
the jury interpretation, the group chooses between convicting and acquitting a defendant who is either guilty or
innocent.
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Private signals Private-Hom Private-Het
Public signals Public-Hom Public-Het
and the realized jar (see Table 2). As can be seen from the table, red (blue) types are biased
towards the red (blue) jar. If agents are risk neutral and self-interested, this payoff specification
is equivalent to the preference specification introduced in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and
Coughlan (2000).5 Committee composition is common knowledge at the start of the game. In
each committee there are either two red types and one blue type or vice-versa.6 In contrast,
homogeneous (Hom) committees consist only of one preference type, either all subjects are red
or blue.
Table 2: Payoff structure
True Jar










Information (Private vs. Public): In private treatments, information is transmitted in two
stages. In substage 1.a, each agent privately observes a signal. A signal takes the form of a
red or blue ball randomly drawn with replacement from the realized jar. The blue (red) jar
contains 7 (3) blue balls and 3 (7) red balls.7 In the subsequent substage 1.b, each agent picks
a simultaneously observed public message from the set {red, blue}.8 In other words, the private
5In those models, a juror’s payoff is determined by a commonly known parameter q ∈ (0, 1). He obtains payoff
−q (resp. −(1 − q)) if the chosen jar is red (blue) while the realized jar blue (red). Payoffs from choosing the
correct jar are normalized to 0. We exclude negative payoffs by applying a positive transformation to the original
ones. Payoffs in Table 2 are equivalent to qblue =
5
6
for blue types and qred =
1
6
for red types in the original
specification.
6A subject whose preference type is (not) shared by some (any) other subject is called a majority (minority)
subject.
7Formally, a signal s is an independent Bernoulli trial from a state-dependent distribution with P (s = red |
red) = P (s = blue | blue) = p = 0.7, while P (s = blue | red) = P (s = red | blue) = 1− p = 0.3.
8Note that a subject does not have the possibility to refrain from sending a message, as in the original Coughlan
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treatments feature a round of simultaneous cheap talk communication. Messages are shown with
an indication of the subject’s preference type, but without a player identifier. In so-called public
treatments, information comes in the form of three conditionally i.i.d. public signals, conditional
on the state, which is equivalent to forced sincere communication.
We introduce some simplifying notation. First, we shall repeatedly be referring to the observed
signal profile of a subject in stage 1. In private treatments, it corresponds to a subject’s own
signal combined with the two signals announced by others. In public treatments, it corresponds
to the three public signals observed. Second, we call a red signal held by a red type a conform
signal and a blue signal held by a red type a contrary signal. Equivalently, we call decision red
(blue) the conform (contrary) decision for a red type (and vice versa for blue types). As can
be seen in Table 2, payoffs are symmetric across red and blue types. Thus, we should expect
identical behavior by red and blue types at symmetric information sets. Consider an outcome
given by a profile of three signals in a public treatment combined with a decision. Construct the
symmetric outcome, which is obtained by replacing any blue (red) signal by a red (blue) signal
as well as reversing the decision. The expected payoff of a red (blue) type given the first outcome
is the same as that of the blue (red) type given the second outcome.
3.2 Experimental Procedure
We use a between-subjects design. Each session contains the following parts: (1) treatment, (2)
strategic communication test (SCT) (only private), (3) individual decision test (IDT), (4) lying
aversion test and (5) social value orientation test. Payoffs from each of the post-experimental tests
are learned after the last test. While (4) and (5) are standard tests adopted from the literature,
(2) and (3) are novel. The SCT test evaluates subjects’ ability to communicate strategically. It
is only taken by subjects in the private treatments (as these involve communication). The IDT
measures subjects’ decision rule in an individual decision task and thus excludes effects related
to beliefs about others’ behavior or social preferences. See Appendix A.2 for a description of the
post-experimental tests (2)-(5).
At the start of each treatment, subjects are randomly assigned a preference type and a
matching group of 6 subjects.9 In each period, two three-subject committees are randomly
formed. An equal number of subjects is assigned to each preference type. In Hom treatments,
each matching group contains either only blue or only red types. In Het treatments, each
matching group contains three blue and three red types. The game is played repeatedly over 20
rounds with random rematching within each matching group. In Het treatments, each subject
(2000) setup.
9Subjects are not informed about the size of the matching group.
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is thus very likely to experience multiple rounds in minority and in majority.
The experiment was conducted in the BonnEconLab in February and March 2015. It was
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and organized with
the software hroot (Bock et al., 2014). A total of 384 University of Bonn students from various
disciplines (15% with an economics major) participated in 16 sessions (each of 24 subjects). 96
subjects participated in each treatment, yielding 16 independent matching groups per treatment.
Subjects received written instructions which were read out loud by the experimenter (see Ap-
pendix A.4 for an English transcript of the original German instructions). To familiarize subjects
with the game and ascertain that they understood it fully, we asked control questions that had
to be answered correctly. Subjects were given the opportunity to privately ask questions. The
amounts earned from the experiment were exchanged at a rate of 150 ECU = 1 Euro. Sub-
jects received the payment from all 20 rounds, which averaged 10.50 Euros and ranged from
5.50 Euros to 16.50 Euros. Subjects additionally earned an average of 4.68 Euros in the post-
experimental tests. On average, one session lasted 65 minutes (40 minutes jury experiment and
25 min post-tests). 58.6 % of subjects were female and average age was 22.6 years.
4 Theoretical Predictions
This section introduces the standard model, the social preference model of joint-payoff maximiza-
tion and the näıve voter model. The first two models assume rational and risk-neutral agents
while they differ on the assumed preferences, i.e. agents maximize own payoffs in the standard
model and joint payoffs in the social preference model. We focus on equilibria in symmetric
strategies, in which agents with identical payoff functions use the same strategy. For each treat-
ment, we obtain theoretical predictions for each of the three models and subsequently derive a
set of testable hypotheses concerning differences in outcomes across treatments.
4.1 Standard Model
The standard model is analyzed in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Coughlan (2000). It
assumes that agents only maximize own expected payoffs and are risk-neutral. Given the payoffs
in Table 2, an agent favors the conform decision (the latter being the red decision given that
he is red-biased and the blue decision when blue-biased) if the conform jar has a conditional
probability of at least 16 ≈ 0.167. The conditional probability of a conform jar after 0, 1, 2 and 3
conditionally i.i.d conform signals of quality p = .7 is given by respectively .07, .3, .7 and .93. The
payoff-maximizing decision rule of each preference type is thus to choose the conform decision if
at least one of the three signals is conform. We denote by Λ(x) the decision rule specifying the
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following probabilities of picking the conform decision after r conform signals:
[Λ(x)](r) =

0 if r = 0,
x if r = 1,
1 if r ≥ 2.
The rule Λ(1) is thus the payoff-maximizing or optimal decision rule of each type. For a given
preference type j ∈ {red, blue}, we call conform-based decision rule a decision rule that maps
from the number of j-signals observed to the probability of choosing decision j. We call j-based
decision rule a decision rule that maps from the number of j-signals observed to the probability
of choosing decision j.
The impossibility result obtained by Coughlan (2000) implies that if the committee contains
at least one blue-biased and one red-biased agent, there exists no equilibrium in which all agents
truth-tell and vote sincerely. To understand the result, assume that the committee contains a
simple majority of blue-biased agents. The decision rule applied in the above putative equilibrium
is the optimal decision rule of blue-biased agents, i.e. choose red only if three red signals are
observed. At the communication stage, the red-biased agent acts under the assumption that his
announcement is pivotal (i.e. affects the final outcome) and thus infers that the two other agents
hold a red signal. This in turn implies that he favors a red decision. If he holds a blue signal, he
thus deviates to announcing a red signal. Our equilibrium prediction for each of the treatments is
given below. For private treatments, we restrict ourselves to equilibria featuring truth-telling by
the numerically dominant type and sincere voting by both types. As the numerically dominant
type can always get its way at the voting stage given majority rule, truth-telling by this type
appears salient. We obtain the following equilibrium characterization.
Proposition 1.
a. Private-Het: Majority agents truth-tell while the minority agent babbles. Majority agents
condition their vote only on majority agents’ signals. They vote for the conform decision unless
they jointly hold two contrary signals. The minority agent conditions his vote on all members’
signals and applies Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
b. Private-Hom: All agents truth-tell. All agents apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
c. Public-Het: All agents apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
d. Public-Hom: All agents apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
The intuition for our prediction for the Private-Het treatment is as follows. At the voting
stage, the optimal decision rule of the majority preference type conditional on two signals is
implemented. This involves choosing the conform decision unless the two signals are contrary.
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The minority agent is never pivotal at the voting stage and is thus indifferent between both voting
decisions. At the communication stage, a majority agent recognizes that his optimal decision
rule is implemented given the publicly pooled information. A majority agent’s announcement is
pivotal at a unique signal constellation which encourages truth-telling. Assume that red-biased
agents are the majority and consider a red-biased agent i. The unique pivotal scenario is when
he holds a red signal and others hold blue signals. Announcing a red (blue) signal leads to
a red (blue) decision. Indeed, while the voting decision of agent i and the minority agent is
independent of i’s announcement (the first votes red, the other one blue), the other red-biased
agent only votes red if i announces red. Clearly, i prefers to truth-tell. On the other hand,
the communication incentives of a minority agent are trivial. Given that his announcement
is ignored, he is indifferent between all messages and accordingly has no incentive to deviate
from babbling. As to Private-Hom, note that truth-telling is trivially incentive compatible as
an agent knows that his optimal decision rule is implemented at the decision stage given pooled
information.
We derive three treatment hypotheses from the above proposition concerning (a) communi-
cation, (b) use of information and (c) voting behavior.
Set of Hypotheses 1.
a. Communication: In private treatments, communication by minority subjects in heterogeneous
committees is less informative than (i) communication by majority subjects in heterogeneous
committees and (ii) communication by subjects in homogenous committees.
b. Voting in private treatments: In Private-Het, majority subjects condition their vote less on
the announcement of minority subjects than on that of majority subjects.
c. Voting in public treatments: In public treatments, the frequency of a conform vote given an ob-
served signal profile containing one conform signal is the same in homogeneous and heterogeneous
committees.
The hypothesis regarding voting behavior that appears in c. is formulated only for public
treatments because these by definition exclude any potential skepticism towards information
arising as a consequence of communication. These treatments thus provide clean evidence of
how subjects decide on the basis of unambiguously trustworthy public information. We focus
on behavior given a single conform signal because we expect most of the variation in behavior
(across subjects or treatments) to arise at this particular information set.
4.2 Social Preference Model
In this model we assume that agents maximize the sum of committee members’ individual type-
specific payoffs. Agents thus behave as if they all shared the same payoff function given by the
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average payoff function. In a committee with two (one) blue agents and one (two) red agent, this
implies that agents require a conditional probability of the red jar of approximately 0.61 (.39) in
order to favor the red decision. Accordingly, the optimal decision rule conditional on three signals
is to vote in line with the majority of signals (Λ(0)), whatever one’s preference type. Our selected
equilibrium prediction for this model features full truth-telling for any committee composition.
Full truth-telling appears very intuitive given that all jurors share de facto identical goals and
thus understand that they have no reason to distrust each other. Our focus on equilibria featuring
the maximal achievable amount of information pooling is furthermore in line with our analysis
of the standard model.
Proposition 2.
a. Private-Het: All agents truth-tell and apply Λ(0) to the observed signal profile.
b. Private-Hom: All agents truth-tell and apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
c. Public-Het: All agents apply Λ(0) to the observed signal profile.
d. Public-Hom: All agents apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
Though committee composition does not affect communication in the above predictions, it
however affects the implemented decision rule. While heterogeneous committees vote in line
with the majority of signals, homogenous committees implement the type-specific decision rule
Λ(1). Note that our model corresponds to the extreme point of a continuum of models in which a
parameter (say α ∈ [0, 1]) measures the degree of altruism of agents. Agents maximize a function
given by α times their individual payoff and 1−α times the total committee payoff. We set α = 0
for simplicity of exposition, but our predictions for all the treatments would still hold for α small
enough.10 We derive the following set of hypotheses from the above proposition.
Set of Hypotheses 2.
a. Communication: In private treatments, communication is equally informative (i) in homoge-
neous and heterogeneous committees, and (ii) across majority and minority subjects.
b. Voting in private treatments: In Private-Het, subjects condition their vote equally on all sig-
nals featured in the observed signal profile.
c. Voting in public treatments: In public treatments, subjects apply different decision rules de-
pending on whether they are in a homogeneous or heterogeneous committee. The frequency of a
conform vote given an observed signal profile containing one conform signal is higher in homo-
geneous committees than in heterogeneous committees.
10Namely, α ≤ 0.699 for minority Private-Het subjects and α ≤ 0.402 for majority Private-Het subjects. While
the specific utility function assumed allows us to generate point predictions, other forms of social preferences, as
inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or a taste for efficiency (Charness and Rabin, 2002) would also predict
treatment differences.
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4.3 Näıve Voter model
In his seminal essay, Condorcet (1785) assumed that all individuals have the same objective
of making a correct decision, ignore the strategic aspects of committee-decision making and
simply vote as if they were the only voter (i.e. sincerely). Translating this idea into our setting
means that agents truth-tell and vote in line with the majority of announced signals. They thus
choose the alternative that is most likely to be true without taking into account their expected
payoffs. This näıve voter model is also in line with the behavior of subjects in treatments with
communication in the experiment of Goeree and Yariv (2011).
Proposition 3.
a. Private-Het: All agents truth-tell and apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
b. Private-Hom: All agents truth-tell and apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
c. Public-Het: All agents apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
d. Public-Hom: All agents apply Λ(1) to the observed signal profile.
Set of Hypotheses 3.
a. Communication: In private treatments, communication is equally informative (i) in homoge-
neous and heterogeneous committees, and (ii) across majority and minority subjects.
b. Voting in private treatments: In Private-Het, subjects condition their vote equally on all sig-
nals featured in the observed signal profile.
c. Voting in public treatments: In public treatments, subjects apply the same red-based decision
rule independent of (i) whether they are in a homogeneous or heterogeneous committee and (ii)
whether their preference type is blue or red.
5 Results: Aggregate behavior
In what follows, we analyze aggregate communication and voting behavior and test the hypothe-
ses formulated in our theoretical predictions section. We pool red and blue types.11
5.1 Communication
Table 3 shows average lying rates based on individual averages conditional on the signal received
for Private-Hom subjects, minority Private-Het subjects and majority Private-Hom subjects.
11As already noted earlier, this should be unproblematic given the symmetry of payoffs across types. This is
confirmed by statistical analysis. For each type of signal held (conform or contrary) and each possible committee
position (i.e. Private-Het majority, Private-Het minority or Private-Hom), we do not find significant differences
across preference types in terms of voting and communication decisions (two-sided Mann-Whitney rank-sum test)
(MW test in what follows).
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The lying rate after a conform signal is approximately 0 for all three types of subjects. On the
other hand, the lying rate after a contrary signal is substantially larger for all three types, though
it remains low in absolute terms. In the table below, recall that in Hom treatments, a subject is
by definition always a majority subject.12
Table 3: Lying rates in private treatments in %
Private-Hom Private-Het
Signal lying rate n lying rate n
contrary in minority 21.9 (34.44) 324
contrary in majority 10.2 (22.52) 1019 14.9 (27.11) 635
conform in minority 1.0 (5.94) 316
conform in majority 0.7 (4.8) 901 0.5 (2.86) 645
Notes: Standard deviation are denoted in brackets. n denotes the number of observations in each
respective information set.
We find no evidence of babbling by minority Private-Het subjects. Recall that babbling by a
given subject requires the latter to use the same distribution over messages after each signal that
he might hold, the choice of the distribution being arbitrary. Given that minority Private-Het
subjects have a lying rate of almost 0 after conform signals, babbling would imply that they
always lie after a contrary signal. A one-sided t-test clearly rejects this conjecture (p < 0.001).
For this and all following tests, we use matching groups as independent units of observation. We
find marginally significant evidence that minority Private-Het subjects lie more after contrary
signals than majority Private-Het subjects (one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank, WX test, p = 0.098)
and significant evidence that minority Private-Het subjects lie more than Private-Hom subjects
(one-sided Mann-Whitney, MW test, p = 0.02). The increased lying rate of minority subjects
is in line with the idea of the unilaterial deviation scenario arising in the hypothetical truthful-
sincere equilibrium analyzed by Coughlan (2000), i.e. minority types lie to majority types hoping
that their message is taken at face value, which in turn would bend the majority types’ decision
rule towards the one of the minority type.
To measure whether subjects lie more over the course of periods, we run a regression with the
dummy variable lie after a contrary signal as dependent variable (see Table A2 in Appendix). We
find that over time subjects lie significantly more, however, the effect is small. In this analysis,
we also test the impact of lying aversion (as measured in the post-experiment lying aversion test)
12Lying rates of subjects in Private-Hom are shown in the row majority.
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on lying behavior in the treatments. Lying aversion has little explanatory power overall but
strongly correlates with the lying behavior of the subsample of subjects who lied at least once.13
Summarizing, behavior at the communication stage thus yields mixed results. There is no
evidence of babbling by minority subjects as specified by our equilibrium prediction for the
standard model. On the other hand, minority subjects in Private-Het lie significantly more than
subjects in Private-Hom, which is at odds with both behavioral models.
Result 1.
Subjects to a large extent truth-tell. However, there is more lying by minority subjects after
contrary signals than after conform signals and marginally more truth-telling in homogenous
committees than in heterogeneous committees.
5.2 Voting in private treatments
The standard model predicts that majority subjects in heterogenous committees ignore the in-
formation provided by minority types. Both alternative models, however, predict that subjects
conditional equally on all announced signals (as everybody is predicted to truth-tell). We there-
fore focus on majority Private-Het subjects and analyze the extent to which they condition their
voting decision on the announcement of minority Private-Het subjects. Table 4 shows a majority
type’s frequency of choosing the conform decision as a function of his own signal (a conform signal
takes the value of 1 and a contrary signal takes the value of 0) and the announcement of the two
remaining subjects, one majority type and one minority type. Choice frequencies show that the
information provided by the minority type is influential. To see that, compare choice frequencies
in cases that differ only according to the message announced by the minority type: 1 vs 3, 2 vs
4, 5 vs 7 and 6 vs 8. Choice frequencies furthermore show that minority type announcements are
approximately as influential as majority type announcements (compare cases 2 vs 3 and 6 vs 7).
The above findings are confirmed by statistical analysis. We perform two comparisons that
each hold the observed signal profile constant. The first comparison involves cases 2 and 3,
for which our respective theoretical predictions, as derived from the standard model, differ.
Both cases involve an observed signal profile containing only one conform signal. When the
conform message is sent by the other majority type (Case 2), the prediction for the majority
type is to vote conform. When the same message is however sent by the minority type (Case
3), the prediction is a contrary vote. We find that the frequencies of a conform decision do not
13In the appendix we also examine behavior in the SCT that was designed to test subjects’ ability to communicate
strategically. It provides no clear insights as to whether subjects understood the incentive of strategic lying. Many
subjects continue acting in the SCT as in the treatment, rendering the SCT results little informative. See Appendix
A.3.4 for a discussion.
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Table 4: Voting behavior by majority types in Private-Het






1 188 0 0 0 0 0.11
2 219 0 1 0 1 0.19
3 106 0 0 1 0 0.22
0.21
4 122 0 1 1 1 0.96
5 161 1 0 0 1 0.45
6 184 1 1 0 1 0.97
7 88 1 0 1 1 1.0
0.0462
8 212 1 1 1 1 1.0
Notes: n denotes the number of observations of each case. The observed signal profile includes the
majority type’s own signal, the message by the other majority type and the message by the minority
type. The voting behavior shows the predicted frequency to vote conform (according to the standard
model) and the actual frequency to vote conform. WX is a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (1one-sided,2two-
sided). The unit of independent observation is the matching group.
differ between cases 2 and 3 (one-sided WX test, p = 0.2). The second comparison involves
cases 6 and 7, for which the standard model predicts the same frequency of conform votes.
In cases 6 and 7, the majority type holds a conform signal, which implies that he favors a
conform decision independently of the signals announced by others. A two-sided WX test rejects
(p = 0.046) the hypothesis that the frequency of a conform decision in case 6 is equal to that
in case 7. A minority type’s announcement is actually slightly more influential than that of
a majority type. A potential explanation is that a minority type announcing a signal that
contradicts his bias (e.g. a blue-biased subject announcing a red signal) is naturally perceived as
credible. Summarizing, information sent by minority subjects is thus not disregarded. This result
contradicts the prediction of the standard model, but is in line with both behavioral models.
Result 2.
In heterogeneous committees majority subjects condition their vote on the announcement of the
minority subject. Majority subjects condition their vote on the announcement of the minority
subject approximately as much as on that of a majority subject.
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5.3 Voting in public treatments
Figures 1a and 1b show, for each treatment, the frequencies of votes for the conform jar of
each preference type as a function of the number of conform signals in the observed signal
profile. For all treatments and preference types, subjects vote conform with a probability that is
clearly smaller than one (around 0.35) given a unique conform signal, which is also confirmed by
statistical tests. A t-test rejects that the frequency of a conform vote given one conform signal
is equal to 1 in the public treatments (one-sided t-test, p < 0.001). Average decision rules thus
exhibit what could be termed a reversal to the middle. This is also reflected in the results of the
IDT, which excludes any role of strategic interaction or social preferences. Only 27.34% of all
subjects apply their payoff-maximizing decision rule, but 70.31% apply the majority heuristic.
For further information on the IDT see A.3.5.
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(b) Red types
The social preference model predicts for the heterogeneous committee in the public treatment
that the frequency of a conform vote given one conform signal is equal to 0, which is also
rejected by a one-sided t-test (p < 0.001). In other words, subjects do not apply Λ(0) to the
observed signal profile either. More importantly, the frequency of a conform decision given one
conform signal does not differ between homogenous and heterogeneous committees in the public
treatments (two-sided MW, p = 0.89), which means that voting decisions do not depend on the
group composition, which the social preference model would have predicted.
The näıve voter model predicts that subjects vote with the majority of announced signals,
i.e. vote red if there are at least two red signals (and vice-versa for blue), independent of their
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own preference type. To test this prediction, we look at the voting decision conditional on red
signals in the observed signal profile (see Figure 2). Both after one and after two red signals,
the probability of a red vote by a red type is much larger than the corresponding probability for
a blue type (two-sided MW, p < 0.01, in each treatment).
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Notes: This figure displays voting behavior for red and blue types pooled over treatments.
Result 3.
Voting decisions in public treatments do not depend on the group composition. Both types apply
roughly the same conform-based decision rule given by Λ(.4). In other words, the red-based
decision rule applied by blue types is significantly different from the red-based decision rule applied
by red types.
We briefly add a comment on risk aversion. If subjects had very concave utility functions and
were thus very risk averse, the utility maximizing decision rule would be Λ(0) given three signals.
To test whether risk attitudes influenced behavior, we run a regression for the public treatments
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal 1 if the subject votes for the conform decision
and 0 otherwise. The coefficient for risk aversion is marginally significant (p ≤ 0.10) and small
in size, in contrast to the coefficients for the IDT threshold and the dummies for the number of
conform messages. We therefore conclude that risk aversion had a negligible impact on behavior
(see Appendix A.3.2 and regression (1) in Table A3). We also controlled for learning effects in
the regression and find that subjects voted more often for the conform jar over the course of
time, albeit the effect is small in size.
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5.4 Welfare
Table 5 shows average payoffs per treatment (based on matching group averages). Payoff dif-
ferences between Private-Het and Public-Het are marginally significant (MW, p < 0.097), while
there are no significant differences between Private-Hom and Public-Hom. Transiting from the
public to the private treatments thus only causes a significant loss of information in the case of
heterogeneous committees. Note that we focus on payoffs as welfare criterion since minimizing
the number of wrong outcomes is the welfare-maximizing rule only in heterogeneous and thus
not in homogenous committees (see Table A1 in Appendix on the share of wrong decisions per
treatment and type).
Table 5: Average payoffs per treatment
Public-Hom Public-Het Private-Hom Private-Het
81.39 (10.03) 79.92 (5.74) 78.86 (11.26) 75.73 (7.54)
Notes: Standard deviation are denoted in brackets.
5.5 Summarizing findings
Our equilibrium prediction for the standard model is not borne out by the data. We find no
evidence of babbling by minority subjects in Private-Het. Second, majority subjects condition
their vote roughly as much on minority subjects’ announcements as on those of majority subjects.
Third, in public treatments, each type’s average decision rule significantly differs from the payoff-
maximizing decision rule. Instead, each preference type’s average decision rule is heavily skewed
towards the majority heuristic that consists in voting for the decision indicated by the majority
of signals. The prediction derived for the social preference model is also contradicted. In the
public treatments, we observe no significant shift in decision rules between heterogeneous and
homogenous committees, which indicates that committee composition does not significantly affect
subjects’ payoffs. Finally, the prediction of the näıve voter model is also not matched by the
data. Blue and red types apply significantly different red-based decision rules. Also, minority
subjects lie slightly more than majority subjects in heterogeneous committees (albeit lying rates
remain very low in absolute terms), and they lie more after contrary signals than after conform
signals.
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6 Heterogeneity in behavior
Our previous section on aggregate behavior documents a low lying rate and an “intermediate” de-
cision rule that lies in between the type-specific optimal decision rule and the majority heuristic.
In the following section, we analyze whether the observed aggregate behavior reflects homo-
geneous individual behavior or rather covers individual heterogeneity. To guide the empirical
analysis, we propose a cognitive heterogeneity model.
6.1 Cognitive Heterogeneity Model
Heterogenity in behavior has been modeled by level-k reasoning models (see Stahl and Wilson,
1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) which focus on the interaction between
agents whose depth of reasoning, as captured by an integer k, is heterogeneous.14 In the basic
version, a level-k thinker best responds to the assumption that all other agents are level-(k − 1)
agents. The strategy used by level-0 agents is exogenously specified and the behavior of remaining
agents is thus characterized recursively. Experimenters have found that for a variety of games
(see Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) for centipede games, see Crawford and Iriberri (2007) for
auctions), given distributions of level-k types fit the data quite well. Level-k has also been used
to describe behavior in cheap talk games (Cai and Wang, 2006; Wang et al., 2010; Kawagoe T,
2009) where the level-0 strategy of a sender (receiver) is assumed to be truth-telling (trusting).
Consider the following simple specification of the level-k model. Level-0 agents behave as
in the näıve voter model: they truth-tell and vote for the decision indicated by the majority
of announced signals. Level-1 agents best respond to the assumption that all others are level-0
agents and maximize individual payoffs. This involves lying after a contrary signal not only
in minority but also in majority (whether in a heterogeneous or in a homogenous committee),
as well as applying the type-specific payoff-maximizing decision rule. The lying incentive in
minority echoes the profitable unilateral deviation scenario arising in the putative truthful-sincere
equilibrium analyzed by Coughlan (2000). Lying bends the decision rule applied by majority
types (if the lie is taken at face value) and therefore constitutes a profitable individual deviation.
In majority and in a homogenous committee lying can bend the decision rule of level-0 types
who wrongfully apply the majority heuristic instead of the optimal decision rule. This is only a
profitable deviation if there is a high fraction of level-0 types. Lying in majority can be interpreted
as benevolent, given that a lying subject improves the expected payoff of other subjects sharing
his preference type.
The above model ignores important behavioral features that appear empirically relevant.
14See also Goeree and Holt (2004) for a related model of noisy introspection.
19
First, agents act noisily in response to beliefs, as captured, for example, by the popular quantal
response model proposed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). Second, lying in majority is
less intuitive than lying in minority. Finally, there is experimental evidence that subjects exhibit
different levels of reasoning across different families of games (see Georganas et al., 2015). One
way to rationalize this latter finding is to assume that the strategic sophistication level of an
agent’s behavior in a given game depends on the relation between the game’s complexity and
the agent’s exogenous level of cognitive sophistication. An individual characterized by a given
level of sophistication will exhibit a higher depth of reasoning, the simpler the game.
We incorporate some of the above concerns into a noisy version of the above introduced model
of level-k thinking featuring level-1 agents that differ in their strategic sophistication. Let any
level-1 agent exhibit a sophistication level s drawn from a distribution g with full support on
[0, 1]. Variable s determines the propensity of a level-1 agent to make errors. More precisely,
let any s be associated with probabilities l(z, s) and d(s). The function l(z, s) indicates the
probability that a level-1 agent of sophistication level s lies after a contrary signal given that
a total of z ∈ {1, 2, 3} agents (him included) have his preference type in the committee. The
function d(s) indicates the probability that the level-1 agent applies decision rule Λ(1) to the
observed signal profile as opposed to Λ(0), at the voting stage. We make the following extra
assumptions. First, the above introduced functions are continuous and monotonically increasing
in s, reflecting the fact that more sophisticated agents are less prone to make mistakes. Second,
l(z, 1) > .5 > l(z, 0),∀z ∈ {1, 2, 3} and d(1) > .5 > d(0), capturing the fact that a maximally
(minimally) sophisticated level-1 agent is more (less) likely than not to act optimally whatever the
committee composition. Third, l(1, s) > l(2, s) > l(3, s), ∀s ∈ [0, 1], reflecting the fact that lying
is more intuitive the fewer agents share one’s preference type. To close the model, we assume
that level-1 agents always truth-tell after a conform signal. We assume that the committee
only contains level-0 and -1 agents and therefore do not describe the behavior of higher order
types. We summarize our prediction for the above introduced noisy level-k thinking model in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.
a. Private-Het and Private-Hom: Level-0 agents truth-tell and vote for the decision indicated by
the majority of signals in the observed signal profile. Level-1 agents truth-tell after a conform
signal. A level-1 agent of sophistication s applies Λ (d(s)) to the observed signal profile.
b. Private-Het: After a contrary signal, (i) a minority level-1 agent of sophistication s lies with
probability l(1,s), and (ii) a majority level-1 agent of sophistication s lies with probability l(2,s).
c. Private-Hom: After a contrary signal, a level-1 agent of sophistication s lies with probability
l(3,s).
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The above proposition implies a particular pattern of lying and voting rates in private treat-
ments, as we explain below. If we classify subjects into categories on the basis of scenarios in
which they lie consistently, a subject’s category will be predictive of his sophistication level.
We define four categories, C1-C4, for Private-Het and two categories, C5-C6, for Private-Hom.
Consistent lying at a given information set is defined as lying more than 50% of the time. In
the Private-Het category C1, agents lie consistently both in majority and minority. In C2 (C3)
agents lie consistently only in minority (majority) and in C4 agents never lie consistently. In the
Private-Hom category C5, agents lie consistently while in C6 agents do not.
Given the assumed behavior of level-k types, C3 behavior is not generated by the model and
the group of subjects categorizable as C3 should thus be empty. To see this, recall that a level-1
agent of sophistication s is more likely to lie after a contrary signal if in minority than if in
majority. The law of large numbers thus implies that if an agent consistently lies in majority, he
must also consistently lie in minority. By the law of large numbers, categories C1, C2 and C5
should contain exclusively level-1 agents while categories C4 and C6 should concentrate all level-0
subjects as well as some level-1 agents. The proposition implies different average sophistication
levels across categories C1, C2, C4 and C5. Let E(s|Cx) denote the average sophistication level
among Cx-agents. It must be true that
E(s|C5) > E(s|C1) > E(s|C2) > E(s|C4). (1)
The intuition for the above is as follows. Let threshold sr, for r ∈ {1, 2, 3}, correspond to the
s-value at which l(r, s) crosses the horizontal .5 line. Given that l(1, s) > l(2, s) > l(3, s), ∀s ∈
[0, 1], it is trivially true that s3 > s2 > s1. Now, simply note that C5 subjects are defined by
s ≥ s3, C1 subjects are defined by s ≥ s2, C2 subjects are defined by s2 > s ≥ s1 and C4
subjects are defined by s ≤ s1. In other words, the conditional distribution of s given C5 first
order stochastically dominates (FOSD) the conditional distribution of s given C1. Similarly, the
conditional distribution of s given C1 FOSD the conditional distribution of s given C2 and the
same applies to C2 vs C4.
The above characterization implies a particular ranking of lying rates across categories. Let
E(l(1, s)|Cx) and E(l(2, s)|Cx) denote the average lying rate in respectively minority and major-
ity conditional on being a member of category Cx, for x < 5. Similarly, let E(l(3, s)|Cx) denote
the average lying rate conditional on being a member of category Cx, for x ≥ 5. It must be true
that E(l(1, s)|C1) > E(l(1, s)|C2). This follows from using the fact that l(1, s) is increasing in s
together with the previously obtained inequalities defining the sophistication levels of members
of the different categories. Recall that C1 subjects satisfy s ≥ s2 while instead C2 subjects
satisfy s2 > s.
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Our characterization in contrast does not pin down the relative size of E(l(3, s)|C5) and
E(l(2, s)|C1). Indeed, two effects oppose each other. On the one hand, C5 subjects are more
sophisticated on average than C1 subjects as seen earlier (we call this the selection effect). On
the other hand, for any given s it holds true that l(2, s) > l(3, s), i.e. lying is more intuitive
the fewer agents share one’s preference type. When comparing a C5 and a C1 majority subject
sharing the same sophistication level s, the C5 subject’s probability of lying after a contrary
signal is thus strictly lower than that of the C1 majority subject (we call this the size effect).
Which of the two effects dominates is a priori unclear, so that we cannot make a clear prediction
of the ordering of lying rates for C1 and C5 subjects.
Finally, the obtained characterization implies a particular ranking of voting rates across
categories. Let E(d(s)|Cx) denote the average rate of applying Λ(1) (as opposed to Λ(0)) to the
observed signal profile conditional on being a member of category Cx. It must be true that
E(d(s)|C5) > E(d(s)|C1) > E(d(s)|C2) > E(d(s)|C4). (2)
This follows from using the fact that d(s) is increasing in s together with the previously
obtained inequalities concerning the s-levels of C5, C1, C2 and C4. More precisely, recall that
C5 subjects are defined by s ≥ s3, C1 subjects are defined by s ≥ s2, C2 subjects are defined
by s2 > s ≥ s1 and C4 subjects are defined by s ≤ s1, where s3 > s2 > s1. To see that
E(d(s)|C5) > E(d(s)|C1), note that we have E(d(s)|C5) = E(d(s)|s ≥ s3) while E(d(s)|C1) =
αE(d(s)|s ≥ s3) + (1− α)E(d(s)|s3 > s ≥ s2), for some α ∈ [0, 1], where it is trivially true that
E(d(s)|s ≥ s3) > E(d(s)|s3 > s ≥ s2).
On the basis of the above analysis, we derive the following hypotheses for the cognitive
heterogeneity model.15
Set of Hypotheses 4.
a. The lying rate after a contrary signal in minority of C1 subjects is higher than that of C2
subjects.
b. The average frequency of a conform decision given one conform signal is highest for C5
subjects, followed by C1, C2, and C4 subjects. In other words, there is a significant correlation
between consistently lying after conform signals and consistently applying Λ(1) to the observed
signal profile.
Last, we assume that there is a large majority of level-0 subjects among subjects, so that the
assumption made by level-1 players is empirically approximately correct. This implies that their
15In addition to the predictions on treatment behavior, one can also derive predictions on the post-experimental
tests: a) In the SCT, C1 subjects perform better than C2 subjects who themselves perform better than C4 subjects;
b)C5 subjects have the highest IDT threshold, followed by C1, C2 and C4 subjects.
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lying should be payoff improving.
6.2 Results: Disaggregating behavior
In what follows, we examine our experimental data in light of the predictions derived from
the cognitive heterogeneity model. First, we explore whether there is indeed heterogeneity in
behavior that is consistent with our dichotomy of level-0 and level-1 types. Subsequently, we
examine whether the pattern of lying and voting rates replicates the pattern proposed in the set
of hypotheses 4.16
6.2.1 Evidence of heterogeneous behavior
In what follows, we analyze (a) whether there is a fraction of subjects who consistently lie in
Private-Het minority, Private-Het majority and Private-Hom after a contrary signal, (b) whether
lying after a contrary signal is indeed payoff-increasing, and (c) whether a fraction of subjects
consistently applies its type-specific optimal decision rule Λ(1) to the observed signal profile in
all treatments.
Table 6 depicts the share of consistent liars and non-liars. We define consistent lying at a
given information set as lying at least 50% of the time. While after a contrary signal the share of
subjects who never lied amounts to approximately two thirds, almost all subjects never lie after
a conform signal (above 96% in all three scenarios). We find that 9.38% of Private-Hom subjects
lie consistently after a contrary signal, 14,58% in Private-Het majority and 25% in Private-Het
minority. The relative size of these three groups supports our conjecture that lying is more
intuitive (and probable), the higher the number of subjects of the other preference type.
Table 6: Share of non- and consistent liars (in %)
Private-Hom Private-Het
contrary conform contrary conform
min maj min maj
Lied never 77.08 96.88 65.22 66.67 96.77 96.88
Lied consistently 9.38 0.00 25.00 14.58 1.08 0.00
In the cognitive heterogeneity model lying is payoff-increasing because only a small fraction
of cognitively sophisticated subjects (level-1 subjects) seizes the available profitable lying op-
portunity. Table 7 reports results from mixed-effects regressions with profits per period as the
16We refer to Appendix A.3.4 and A.3.5 for the analysis of the predicted ordering in the post-experimental tests.
We refer to these results when appropriate.
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dependent variable. Regression (1) includes data from both private treatments (1) while (2) only
includes data from Private-Het.
Regression (1) indicates that lying is generally profitable. On average, a lie increases payoffs
significantly from 46.77 to 58.97 tokens. The non-significance of the Hom and Lie Contrary*Hom
coefficients in (1) indicates that the profitability of lying does not depend on the group compo-
sition being homogeneous or heterogeneous. Moreover, the non-significance of the Minority and
Lie Contrary*Minority coefficients in (2) indicates that the profitability of lying does not depend
on being in majority or minority.17
With regards to the heterogeneity in voting behavior, we observe that across all treatments
a significant proportion of subjects consistently applies Λ(1) to the observed signal profile. In
Public-Het and Public-Hom we find that a share of respectively 41.66% and 44.79% of subjects
consistently (i.e. more than 50% of the time) votes for the conform decision given an observed
signal profile containing a unique conform signal. In Private-Het and Private-Hom, these shares
decrease to respectively 29.17% and 28.13%. The decrease in shares when going from public to
private treatments naturally follows from the skepticism towards information retrieved through
communication.18
6.2.2 Lying and voting behavior by categories
The following important caveat applies to this part of our analysis. In order to examine whether
our data is consistent with the predicted order in lying and voting behavior, we simply compare
empirical frequencies across selected categories of subjects and perform no statistical tests. One
key reason is that we disaggregate behavior across subgroups of limited size, which implies
low statistical power. Our exercise here is thus rather to be interpreted as a preliminary and
exploratory analysis and not as statistical hypothesis testing.
Table 8 shows for all categories C1-C6 the following statistics: 1) the number of subjects in
each category, 2) the lying rates after a contrary signal in minority and majority, and finally 3) the
frequency of a vote for the conform jar given an observed signal profile containing one conform
signal. In line with previous results, the categories C4 and C6 contain the vast majority of
subjects, 72% in Private-Het and 91% in Private-Hom. According to the cognitive heterogeneity
17Individual lying implies a coordination problem. If two subjects of the same preference type and both holding
a contrary signal lie simultaneously, the triggered shift in the decision rule will be excessive. In accordance with
this observation, we indeed find a decrease in profits when there are two simultaneous lies. This scenario however
only arise extreme rarely, i.e. in less than 2% of cases, this being a trivial consequence of the low aggregate lying
rate and of the small committee size. See Appendix A.3.3 for an analysis.
18We find similar shares in the IDT where 27.34% of all subjects apply the optimal decision rule and 70.31%
apply the majority heuristic. For further information see A.3.5.
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Table 7: Lying and Payoffs
(1) (2)
Private Private-Het













# of Groups 32 16
# of Ind. 192 96
Notes: This table reports coefficients using a linear panel model with mixed effects. Re-
gression (1) includes a dummy Lie Contrary equal to 1 if lying after a contrary signal and
0 otherwise, a dummy Hom equal to 1 for Private-Hom and 0 for Private-Het, as well as
an interaction term Lie Contrary*Hom. Regression (2) controls for being in minority (mi-
nority) and lying in minority (Lie Contrary*Minority). Standard errors in parentheses.***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
model, these correspond mostly to level-0 agents. C1 and C2 subjects together constitute roughly
25% of Private-Het subjects while C5 subjects constitute 9% of subjects in Private-Hom. These
three categories of subjects correspond to level-1 agents in the model. Finally, the number of C3
subjects is very low (3%) as predicted.
In minority, the lying rate of C1 subjects (80.2%) is higher than that of C2 subjects (71.5%),
as predicted. Recall that the intuition is that category C1 subjects exhibit a higher average level
of sophistication than C2 subjects. In addition, we find that the lying rate of the C5 subjects
is higher than that of C1 subjects (85.6% vs 77.6%), which suggests that the selection effect
(i.e., being in C5 requires a higher sophistication level than being in C1) dominates the size
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Table 8: Lying and voting behavior by categories
Category Obs Lying rates Vote
Minority Majority Conform
Het
C1 11 80.2% 77.6% 66.9%
C2 12 71.5% 10.4% 49.5%
C3 3 6.7% 55.7% 42.6%
C4 66 3.9% 3.5% 23.5%
Hom
C5 9 85.6% 70.3%
C6 87 2.4% 25.1%
Notes: In Private-Het, we could not categorize 4 subjects because they did not receive a
contrary signal in minority.
effect (i.e. lying as majority type in a heterogeneous committee is more intuitive than lying in a
homogeneous committee). Finally, C4 agents have a very low average lying rate in both minority
and majority, which is compatible with these being to a large extent level-0 agents who always
truth-tell.19 We also find the predicted ordering in the voting behavior: C5 vote more often
conform than C1, C1 more often than C2 and C2 more often than C4.20
Result 4.
The lying rate after a contrary signal in minority of C1 subjects is higher than the one of C2
subjects. Similarly, C5 most often vote conform given an observed signal profile containing one
conform signal, followed by C1, C2 and C4 subjects. There is thus a positive correlation between
consistently lying after contrary signals and consistently applying Λ(1) to the observed signal
profile.
Summarizing, we find results that are consistent with the main predictions of the cognitive
heterogeneity model. At the communication stage in private treatments, a small fraction of
subjects (17% on average across treatments) consistently lies after contrary signals while the
19Appendix A.3.4 analyzes whether subjects in higher categories also perform better in the SCT. We find no
clear ranking of performance in the SCT. Results suggest that subjects did not understand the (quite complex)
SCT and therefore continued acting as in the treatment, although optimal behavior in the SCT deviates from
optimal behavior in the treatment.
20We have repeated the analysis for two more demanding definitions of consistent lying, that place the bar at
respectively 60% and 65%. Most results survive, in terms of Table 8. The only change is that the ranking of the
rates of conform voting of C1 and C5 subjects is now reverted. These however remain close, and closer to each
other than to remaining rates (in particular the C1 vs the C2 rates). Results are available on request.
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vast majority of subjects always truth-tells. Across treatments, roughly 35% of subjects consis-
tently apply their type-specific payoff-maximizing decision rule. Finally and most importantly,
consistent lying after contrary signals is significantly associated with applying the type-specific
payoff-maximizing decision rule. We thus identify two groups of agents whose behaviour corre-
sponds approximately to that of respectively level-1 and -0 agents in the cognitive heterogeneity
model.
7 Conclusion
This paper reports results from a 2x2 experimental design aimed at understanding the drivers of
individual behavior in a simple communication and voting game featuring known heterogeneous
preference types. Besides the standard model of self-interested and strategic agents, we also
tested models of social preferences and of näıve voters. Aggregate behavior is not consistent
with any of the models which share the feature that they assume homogenous agents. Further
disaggregating results, we find heterogeneous individual behavior that is consistent with the
predictions of a level-k model featuring two cognitive sophistication levels. The numerically
dominant level-0 subjects truth-tell and predominantly vote with the majority of signals. In
contrast, sophisticated subjects tend to apply their type-specific payoff-maximizing decision rule
and lie in a way that allows them to influence the commitee’s decision in their favor.
Our experimental findings caution against interpreting low lying rates as reflecting homoge-
nous truthful communication (with a low uniform rate of lying). Rather, the lying rates are
consistent with the presence of a small share of sophisticated consistent liars facing a large ma-
jority of unsophisticated truth-tellers. More broadly, this paper highlights the need to integrate
cognitive heterogeneity into models of committee decision-making. The mechanism design liter-
ature has a growing body of works that assume deviations from rationality (e.g. no preference
maximization (de Clippel, 2014), varying but bounded “depths of rationality” (Saran, 2016)).
These may provide a starting point for future theoretical work on committee design.
Though this experiment finds no role for social preferences, richer deliberation processes
may contradict this conclusion. Debate might in some cases stimulate empathy, solidarity and
common identity while it may in other cases reinforce in vs outgroup dichotomies and cause
preference polarization. Future experiments ought thus to examine other deliberation protocols
(e.g. sequential, repeated, subgroup-based).
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Table A1: Share of wrong committee outcomes in %
Public-Hom Public-Het Private-Hom Private-Het
Blue Red Maj Blue Maj Red Blue Red Maj Blue Maj Red
Wrong outcome 21.96 29.65 24.10 22.75 24.38 28.15 30.25 24.64
True jar blue 8.40 39.54 20.05 28.94 19.13 38.95 27.24 25.17
True jar red 35.52 19.75 28.16 16.55 29.63 17.35 33.27 24.11
Notes: The row Wrong Outcome indicates the share of wrong outcomes over all decisions, the row True jar
blue (red) depicts the share of wrong outcomes when the true jar is blue (red). Blue (red) indicates that
the committees contained only blue (red) types. Maj Blue (red) indicates that the majority of types in the
committee is blue (red).
A.2 Post-experimental tests
The following post-experimental tests were conducted: the strategic communication test (SCT),
the individual decision test (IDT), the lying aversion test and the social value orientation (SVO)
slider.
The SCT test evaluates subjects’ ability to communicate strategically. It is only taken by
subjects in the private treatments (as these involve communication) and quasi-replicates the
treatment game. A subject keeps his preference type from the treatment. Other subjects are
now substituted with computers whose known strategy is to truthfully announce their signals and
vote sincerely under the assumption of truth-telling by others. In the SCT a subject only chooses
his announcement in the communication stage. At the voting stage, he is replaced by a computer
which votes sincerely on the basis of the subject’s signal and others’ (truthfully announced)
signals. Payoffs obtained by the two computerized committee members are randomly allocated
to two treatment participants. We use the strategy method to elicit all choices conditional on
being in minority or majority and the available signal. In Het subjects face four scenarios: one
is either in majority or in minority and one either holds a contrary or a conform signal. Of
these, only the minority and contrary signal scenario provides a payoff-incentive to lie. In Hom
subjects face two scenarios. The committee is homogeneous and one holds either a contrary or
a conform signal. In both of these cases truth-telling is payoff-maximizing.
The second test is the IDT which evaluates the ability to choose the optimal decision rule.
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A subject observes three signals as in the public treatments but now chooses a jar alone. As
compared to the treatments, the IDT excludes effects related to beliefs about others’ behavior
or social preferences. We use the strategy method. Subjects make a decision for each of the four
possible signal profiles, as we seek to identify the minimal number of conform signals required by
a subject to choose the conform decision. A subject requiring a minimum of x conform signals to
choose the conform decision is said to follow the threshold rule x. On the basis of IDT behavior,
we assign threshold rule x to a given subject if the difference between 4 and his total number of
conform decisions is x.21
The third test is a lying aversion test based on Gneezy et al. (2013). It is a two-player
deception game where the sender’s decision to lie increases own payment independent of the
receiver’s decision (see the original paper for more details). In contrast to Gneezy et al. (2013),
any subject is assigned twice to a two-persons matching group and plays the game once as a
sender and once as a receiver. We only use the decision made by subjects when acting as sender.
We furthermore only let subjects play the game once in each role. Our test results replicate
those of Gneezy et al. (2013).
The fourth test is a social value orientation slider aimed at measuring social preferences
(Murphy et al., 2011). At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire gathering
information about their risk aversion, trust of others, and demographic characteristics. Subjects
were also asked specific questions on how they played and underlying motives.
A.3 Additional analysis
A.3.1 Lying aversion
Lying behavior in the experiment may have been affected by agents’ lying aversion, which was
measured in the post-treatment lying aversion test. To test this hypothesis, we run three different
regressions. Regression (1) is a discrete choice model with the dummy variable lie given a contrary
signal as dependent variable. In regressions (2) and (3), we use a linear regression and take as
dependent variable the number of lies during the 20 periods. In regression (2) we include all
subjects, while in regression (3) we only include subjects who lied at least once. Regressions (1)
and (2) allow us to test whether the independent variables influence respectively the probability
to lie or the frequency of lying over the 20 rounds. In addition, we use the restriction at least one
lie for regression (3), as we conjecture that subjects who lied at least once were more likely to
identify the lying incentive. We use as independent variables the treatment dummy Het, Period
21Two caveats are in order. First, the assignment method rests on the assumption that subjects’ decision rule is
monotonic in the number of conform signals. Second, our method does not allow us to observe whether a subject’s
decision rule is stochastic as opposed to deterministic.
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to control for learning effects, the dummy variable SCT to check for comprehension of lying
incentives22, IDT treshold, lying aversion, SVO, a dummy for subjects studying Economics and
a gender dummy Male. We find that lying aversion exclusively influenced the behavior of those
subjects who lied at least once. The variable lying aversion has no significant influence in either
regression (1) or regression (2). As soon as we drop all non-lying subjects from regression (3),
we find that lying aversion negative impacts the number of lies.
A.3.2 Risk attitude and decision-making
The post-experimental questionnaire contained a non-incentivized question on risk attitudes.
This question was taken from the German SocioEconomic Panel (SOEP). Subjects were asked
about their “willingness to take risks in general”, and had to indicate their answer on a scale
ranging from 0 (“risk averse”) to 10 (“fully prepared to take risks”). This measure was found to
highly correlate with incentivized measures on risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2011). The variable
risk in the regression below corresponds to this measure.
To test whether risk attitudes influenced behavior, we run a regression for the public treat-
ments where the dependent variable is a dummy equal 1 if the subject votes for the conform
decision and 0 otherwise. Besides risk attitude (as retrieved from the post-experiment question-
naire), independent variables include subjects’ IDT threshold, dummy variables for the number
of conform signals, the A-levels math grade, the dummy variables Economics and Male. The
coefficient for risk aversion is marginally significant (p ≤ 0.10) and small in size, in contrast to the
coefficients for the IDT threshold and the dummies for the number of conform messages. Note
that the risk coefficient loses its significance once we introduce the gender dummy in regression
(2). We find that both variables, Male and Risk, correlate significantly (correlation coefficient
0.19, p < 0.01). We therefore conclude that risk aversion had a negligible impact on behavior.
A.3.3 Potential Coordination Problem of Lying
As outlined in section 6.2.1, we report payoffs of (majority) types after respectively one and two
simultaneous lies in Table A4 to analyze how payoffs depend on the number of simultaneous liars
in a committee. In the private treatments we identify all aggregate signal realizations in which
two subjects of the same preference type hold a contrary signal. These are the instances where
two majority subjects would each have an incentive to lie unilaterally. We build matching group
averages for profits after one lie and after two lies and compare profits. The table indicates
that profits as expected decrease when shifting from one to two simultaneous lies. Crucially,
22We here use the answer from our first question in the SCT. Recall that it was rational to lie in Private-Het,
but not in Private-Hom. The test is useful as a proxy for comprehension of lying incentives.
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Table A2: Impact of lying aversion on lying behavior
Lie Number of lies Number of lies




SCT 3.94*** 4.25*** 3.38***
(0.64) (0.67) (0.73)
IDT threshold -0.85 -0.61 -1.27**
(0.53) (0.41) (0.61)
Lying Aversion 0.04 0.03 0.12**
(0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
SVO -0.03 -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Economics 1.01 0.60 0.45
(0.64) (0.59) (1.04)
Male 0.72 0.43 -0.09
(0.51) (0.29) (0.66)
Constant -4.56*** 1.42 4.43***
(1.16) (0.87) (1.46)
Observations 1,978 192 65
# of groups 32 32 27
# of individuals 192 192 65
Notes: Regression (1) reports marginal effects calculated at the means of covariates using a logit panel model with
mixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for a lie after a contrary signal and 0 otherwise.
Regression (2) and (3) report coefficients using a linear regression model with standard errors clustered on matching
group level. The dependent variable in regression (2) and (3) is the number of lies after a contrary signal over
the course of the treatment by a given subject. In regression (3) we restrict the sample to subjects who lied at
least once. Independent variables include a dummy Het equal to 1 for Private-Het and 0 for Private-Hom, Period
taking the value of the corresponding period, the individual scores from the post-experimental tests, SCT, IDT
threshold, Lying Aversion and SVO. Economics is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for subjects studying
economics, 0 otherwise. Male takes the value of 1 for male subjects, 0 for female subjects. Standard errors in
parentheses.*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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IDT threshold -1.85*** -1.70***
(0.26) (0.26)
1 conform 2.30*** 2.29***
(0.19) (0.19)
2 conform 7.62*** 7.61***
(0.33) (0.33)















Number of groups 30 30
Notes: This table reports marginal effects calculated at the means of covariates using a logit panel model with
mixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 for a conform vote and 0 for a contrary vote.
Independent variables include a dummy Het equal to 1 for Public-Het and 0 for Public-Hom, the IDT threshold,
dummy variables for the number of conform signals, risk, the A-levels math grade, period, Economics (a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 for subjects studying economics, 0 otherwise) and Male (taking the value of 1 for
male subjects, 0 for female subjects).
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however, two simultaneous lies only happen extremely rarely, i.e. in less than 2% of cases. For
all practical purposes, a subject lying at the communication stage can thus legitimately assume
to be the only one lying, as in the unilateral deviation scenario in the putative truthful-sincere
equilibrium analyzed in Coughlan (2000).
Table A4: Profits of majority types per number of lies
1 lie 2 lies
Private-Hom
Average profit 42.75 28.75
Share of obs. 21.35% 1.69%
Private-Het
Average profit 35.13 20.00
Share of obs. 29.14% 1.71%
Notes: Only lies by majority types after a contrary signal are counted in cases where two
majority types hold a contrary signal.
A.3.4 Strategic Communication Test and Communication in the Treatments
After the private treatments subjects took the strategic communication test (SCT) aimed at
checking their understanding of strategic lying. If, as argued, lying in the treatment was driven
by superior cognitive ability, an intuitive conjecture would be that lying after contrary signals in
the treatment correlates positively with better performance in the SCT.
Table A5: Lying in SCT in % by categories
SCT lying




C1 11 9.09 18.18 72.73 0
C2 12 16.67 25.00 8.33 50.00
C3 3 33.33 66.67 0 0
C4 66 0 12.12 6.06 81.82
Hom
C5 9 NA 77.78 NA 22.22
C6 87 NA 5.75 NA 94.25
Recall that Private-Het and Private-Hom subjects did not take the exact same SCT. For
Private-Hom, lying was never individually payoff-improving in the SCT. For Private-Het sub-
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jects, the only scenario where lying was payoff-improving in the SCT was after a contrary signal
in minority. Optimal communication behavior in the SCT thus differed from optimal behavior
in the treatments.
Table A5 shows results in the SCT for each of the treatment groups C1-C6. We report lying
rates conditional on contrary signals. No clear ranking of performance in the SCT emerges across
the considered categories. The only striking regularity is that SCT behavior closely resembles
treatment behavior for all categories but C2. For example, most C1 subjects (72.73%) lie both
in minority and majority in the SCT, just as in the treatment. Similar insights apply to C3,
C4, C5 and C6. Results suggest that subjects did not understand the (quite complex) SCT and
simply continued acting as in the treatment (suggesting the presence of order effects), rendering
SCT results little informative. In particular, the notion that other subjects were replaced by
computers might have caused confusion.
A.3.5 Individual Decision Test and Voting in the Treatments
After the treatment subjects took the individual decision test (IDT) aimed at measuring their
decision rule in an individual decision task. The idea is that the IDT gives a cleaner measurement
for the decision rule than the treatment as it excludes the role of beliefs and strategic interactions.
For the IDT comparison we pool subjects from all treatments since the proportion of individuals
applying each IDT threshold does not differ significantly between treatments. In an ordered
logistic regression featuring the IDT threshold as the dependent variable, the coefficients of all
treatment dummies are insignificant (p > 0.36).










Notes: In Private-Het, we could not categorize 4 subjects because
they did not receive a contrary signal in minority.
IDT results reflect the heterogeneity in voting behavior, 0.78% of subjects have an IDT
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threshold of 0, 27.34% of 1, 70.31% of 2 and 1.56% of 3, thus there are two large groups. More
than two thirds of subject apply the majority heuristic and less than one third the optimal
decision rule. The IDT threshold also correlates with treatment behavior. Subjects with an
IDT threshold of 1 vote conform after one conform signal much more frequently than subjects
with an IDT threshold of 2 (63% vs 24%). More importantly, in Table A6 we analyze the
correlation of lying and IDT behavior. Based on their lying behavior subjects are classified into
categories of a presumably higher sophistication which are presumably more likely to use the
optimal decision rule in the IDT. As predicted, the IDT threshold characterizing the presumably
very sophisticated C5 subjects is very low (1.1) and thus very close to the optimal threshold of 1.
C5 subjects’ threshold is lower than that of C1 Private-Het subjects (1.5). These in turn have a
lower threshold than C2, C4 and C6 subjects (1.8). The only deviation from predictions by the
cognitive heterogeneity model is the high threshold of C2 subjects (and thus suboptimal) in the
light of their good performance in the treatment.
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A.4 Instructions
We print instructions for the Public-Hom blue-biased type (B.1) and for the Private-Hom blue-
biased type (B.2) treatments. Aspects where the instructions differ for red-biased types are
indicated in round brackets. Aspects where the instructions differ for heterogeneous groups are
indicated in square brackets. The subsequent parts mentioned in the instructions refer to the
post-experimental tests. Instructions for post-experimental tests are available upon request.
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General explanations for the participants 
You are taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. You can 
earn money in this experiment. Your payment will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of the 
other participants.  
During the experiment communication is prohibited. Failure to comply will result in exclusion from the 
experiment and loss of earnings. Should you have any questions, please address them to us: hold your 
hand out of the cabin and one of the experimenters will come to your seat. 
At the end of the experiment, all sums of money will be paid to you in cash. During the experiment 
monetary amounts do not correspond to Euro, but to points. In the end, the total point earnings that you 
obtained during the experiment will be converted into Euro, where: 150 points = 1 Euro. 
The study consists of four parts: 
Part 1. Control Questions: you are asked to answer control questions to check comprehension. 
Part 2. Experiment: The experiment consists of several parts. Your earning from all parts will be paid. 
(1) The instructions for Part 1 can be found below. 
(2) You will receive the instructions for the other parts later. 
Part 3. End: After the experiment you will receive a questionnaire with general questions. Please fill 
this out carefully. 
Part 4. Payment: You will receive the payment privately. The other participants will not know the 
amount of your payment. 
 
Instructions Experiment Part 1 
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 20 rounds. [At the beginning of the experiment, you will be 
randomly assigned to a type, type A or type B. The type allocation is maintained throughout the 
experiment.] In each round, all participants will be divided into groups of 3 participants randomly. [Per 
group there are either two Type A-participants and a Type B-participant or a Type A-participant and two 
type B-participants. You will be informed about the group composition at the beginning of each round.] 
The group allocation is renewed at the beginning of each round. Therefore the group composition 
changes in each round. 
In the experiment you have the task to vote for one of two jars. There are two possible jars, which we 
call the Red and the Blue Jar. The Red Jar contains 7 red balls and 3 blue balls. The Blue Jar contains 7 
blue balls and 3 red balls. 
At the beginning of the game one of the two jars will be selected for your group at random. The 
probability that the Red Jar is selected is 50%. The probability that the  
A.5 Instructions Public-Hom blue-biased type
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Blue Jar is selected is also 50%. You will not be told which Jar was selected. In Figure 1 you see the Red 
and the Blue Jar. Figure 2 displays the image of the unknown jar. 






As information you will receive the color of three randomly drawn balls from the jar (see Figure 3). In 
three drawings one ball will be randomly drawn from the jar each time.  Each drawing is carried out in 
two steps: 
1. A ball is drawn from the jar. 
2. The color is written down and the ball is immediately thrown back into the jar. 
The number of balls in the jar thus remains the same at each draw. There are three drawings to obtain 
three balls. Each participant in your group receives the same three balls as information.  
Differently colored balls may be drawn from the jar. However, all the balls are drawn from the same jar. 
 When the Red Jar is selected for your group, each time a ball is drawn from a jar that contains 7 red 
balls and 3 blue balls. 
 When the Blue Jar is selected for your group, each time a ball is drawn from a jar that contains 7 
blue balls and 3 red balls. 
 







After the ball draw the vote takes place. The vote is governed by the following rules: 
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 If the majority of participants votes for the Red Jar, your group decision is the Red Jar. If there are 2 
to 3 votes for the Red Jar and 0 to 1 votes for the Blue Jar, the group decision is therefore the Red 
Jar. 
 If the majority of participants votes for the Blue Jar, your group decision is the Blue Jar. If there are 0 
to 1 votes for the Red Jar and 2 to 3 votes for the Blue Jar, the group decision is therefore the Blue 
Jar. 
The payment you receive for the group decision depends on the accuracy of your group decision and of 
the actual jar. 
 If your group decision corresponds to the selected Jar and the actual jar is the Red Jar, then you will 
receive 40 (160) points. 
 If your group decision corresponds to the selected Jar and the actual jar is the Blue Jar, then you will 
receive 160 (40) points. 
 If your group decision does not correspond to the selected jar, then you will receive 10 points. 
 
Table 1: Payments 
 
After all participants have voted, the votes will be counted and you will be informed about the outcome 
of the vote, i.e. votes for Red Jar,  votes for Blue Jar, group decision, actual color of the jar and your 
payment. After the end of the round you will be assigned into new randomly selected groups and the 
next round begins. 
You will receive the payments from all 20 rounds. 
If you have questions about the experiment, please contact us now. 
Number of votes for 
Red Jar  
Number of votes for 
Blue Jar 




2 or 3 0 or 1 Red Jar Red Jar 40 (160) [160] 
2 or 3 0 or 1 Red Jar Blue Jar 10 [10] 
0 or  1 2 or 3 Blue Jar Red Jar 10 [10] 
0 or  1 2 or 3 Blue Jar Blue Jar 160 (40) [40] 
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experiment and loss of earnings. Should you have any questions, please address them to us: hold your 
hand out of the cabin and one of the experimenters will come to your seat. 
At the end of the experiment, all sums of money will be paid to you in cash. During the experiment 
monetary amounts do not correspond to Euro, but to points. In the end, the total point earnings that you 
obtained during the experiment will be converted into Euro, where: 150 points = 1 Euro. 
The study consists of four parts: 
Part 1. Control Questions: you are asked to answer control questions to check comprehension. 
Part 2. Experiment: The experiment consists of several parts. Your earning from all parts will be paid. 
(1) The instructions for Part 1 can be found below. 
(2) You will receive the instructions for the other parts later. 
Part 3. End: After the experiment you will receive a questionnaire with general questions. Please fill 
this out carefully. 
Part 4. Payment: You will receive the payment privately. The other participants will not know the 
amount of your payment. 
 
Instructions Experiment Part 1 
Part 1 of the experiment consists of 20 rounds. [At the beginning of the experiment, you will be 
randomly assigned to a type, type A or type B. The type allocation is maintained throughout the 
experiment.] In each round, all participants will be divided into groups of 3 participants randomly. [Per 
group there are either two Type A-participants and a Type B-participant or a Type A-participant and two 
type B-participants. You will be informed about the group composition at the beginning of each round.] 
The group allocation is renewed at the beginning of each round. Therefore the group composition 
changes in each round. 
In the experiment you have the task to vote for one of two jars. There are two possible jars, which we 
call the Red and the Blue Jar. The Red Jar contains 7 red balls and 3 blue balls. The Blue Jar contains 7 
blue balls and 3 red balls. 
At the beginning of the game one of the two jars will be selected for your group at random. The 
probability that the Red Jar is selected is 50%. The probability that the  
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Blue Jar is selected is also 50%. You will not be told which Jar was selected. In Figure 1 you see the Red 
and the Blue Jar. Figure 2 displays the image of the unknown jar. 






As information you will receive the color of three randomly drawn balls from the jar (see Figure 3). In 
three drawings one ball will be randomly drawn from the jar each time.  Each drawing is carried out in 
two steps: 
1. A ball is drawn from the jar. 
2. The color is written down and the ball is immediately thrown back into the jar. 
The number of balls in the jar thus remains the same at each draw.  
Figure 3 shows that two cases can occur. You either will be shown a red ball (case 1) or a blue ball (case 
2).  
Figure 3: Example for randomly drawn ball  






Differently colored balls may be drawn from the jar to the participants of the same group. However, all 
the balls are drawn from the same jar. 
 When the Red Jar is selected for your group, each time a ball is drawn from a jar that contains 7 red 
balls and 3 blue balls. 
 When the Blue Jar is selected for your group, each time a ball is drawn from a jar that contains 7 
blue balls and 3 red balls. 
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Now there is an information stage. You will send a message about the color of the ball that was shown to 
you to the other participants in your group. You can choose the content of the message independently of 
the actual color of the ball (see figure 4).  







After you have sent the message, you receive the message of all the other participants of your group 
(see figure 5). In total, you see 3 messages, the messages of the other two participants and your own 
message.  






After the information stage the vote takes place. The vote is governed by the following rules: 
 If the majority of participants votes for the Red Jar, your group decision is the Red Jar. If there are 2 
to 3 votes for the Red Jar and 0 to 1 votes for the Blue Jar, the group decision is therefore the Red 
Jar. 
 If the majority of participants votes for the Blue Jar, your group decision is the Blue Jar. If there are 0 
to 1 votes for the Red Jar and 2 to 3 votes for the Blue Jar, the group decision is therefore the Blue 
Jar. 
The payment you receive for the group decision depends on the accuracy of your group decision and of 
the actual jar. 
 If your group decision corresponds to the selected Jar and the actual jar is the Red Jar, then you will 
receive 40 (160) points. 




 If your group decision corresponds to the selected Jar and the actual jar is the Blue Jar, then you will 
receive 160 (40) points. 
 If your group decision does not correspond to the selected jar, then you will receive 10 points. 
 
Table 1: Payments 
 
After all participants have voted, the votes will be counted and you will be informed about the outcome 
of the vote, i.e. votes for Red Jar,  votes for Blue Jar, group decision, actual color of the jar and your 
payment. After the end of the round you will be assigned into new randomly selected groups and the 
next round begins. 
You will receive the payments from all 20 rounds. 
If you have questions about the experiment, please contact us now. 
 
 
Number of votes for 
Red Jar  
Number of votes for 
Blue Jar 




2 or 3 0 or 1 Red Jar Red Jar 40 (160) [160] 
2 or 3 0 or 1 Red Jar Blue Jar 10 [10] 
0 or  1 2 or 3 Blue Jar Red Jar 10 [10] 
0 or  1 2 or 3 Blue Jar Blue Jar 160 (40) [40] 
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